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dc.contributor.authorKosmetatos, Paul. ; author. ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-28T08:41:29Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-28T08:41:29Z-
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/92-
dc.descriptionSpringerLink (Online service) ;en_US
dc.descriptionPrinted edition: ; 9783319709079 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.description.abstractNowadays remembered mostly through Adam Smith’s references to the short-lived Ayr Bank in the Wealth of Nations, the 1772-3 financial crisis was an important historical episode in its own right, taking place during a pivotal period in the development of financial capitalism and coinciding with the start of the traditional industrialisation narrative. It was also one of the earliest purely financial crises occurring in peacetime, and its progress showed an impressive geographical reach, involving England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the North American colonies. This book uses a variety of previously unpublished archival sources to question the bubble narrative usually associated with this crisis, and to identify the mechanisms of financial contagion that allowed the failure of a small private bank in London to cause rapid and severe distress throughout the 18th century financial system. It re-examines the short and turbulent career of the Ayr Bank, and concludes that its failure was the result of cavalier liability management akin to that of Northern Rock in 2007, rather than the poor asset quality alleged in existing literature. It furthermore argues that the Bank of England’s prompt efforts to contain the crisis are evidence of a Lender of Last Resort in action, some thirty years before the classical formulation of the concept by Henry Thornton. ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Paul Kosmetatos.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1. ‘A Year of Confusion, Dismay, and Distress’: The 1772–73 Financial Crisis and Its Potential Significance -- 2. A Minsky Bubble? Economic Growth and the Financial Sector in 1763–72 -- 3. ‘Roguery’, ‘Stupidity’, and Permissive Regulation: Asset Speculation and Speculative Projects in 1763–72 -- 4. Propagation and Containment: Financial Contagion and the Lender of Last Resort in 1772–73 -- 5. Impact and Resolution -- 6. Conclusion. . ;en_US
dc.format.extentXXIV, 334 p. 45 illus., 9 illus. in color. ; online resource. ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishing :en_US
dc.publisherImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance ;en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance ;en_US
dc.relation.haspart9783319709086.pdfen_US
dc.subjectFinance. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinance--History. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinance. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinancial History. ;en_US
dc.titleThe 1772–73 British Credit Crisisen_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeCham :en_US
dc.classification.lcHG171 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc332.09 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:مدیریت مالی گرایش بانکداری

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Full metadata record
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dc.contributor.authorKosmetatos, Paul. ; author. ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-28T08:41:29Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-28T08:41:29Z-
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/92-
dc.descriptionSpringerLink (Online service) ;en_US
dc.descriptionPrinted edition: ; 9783319709079 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.description.abstractNowadays remembered mostly through Adam Smith’s references to the short-lived Ayr Bank in the Wealth of Nations, the 1772-3 financial crisis was an important historical episode in its own right, taking place during a pivotal period in the development of financial capitalism and coinciding with the start of the traditional industrialisation narrative. It was also one of the earliest purely financial crises occurring in peacetime, and its progress showed an impressive geographical reach, involving England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the North American colonies. This book uses a variety of previously unpublished archival sources to question the bubble narrative usually associated with this crisis, and to identify the mechanisms of financial contagion that allowed the failure of a small private bank in London to cause rapid and severe distress throughout the 18th century financial system. It re-examines the short and turbulent career of the Ayr Bank, and concludes that its failure was the result of cavalier liability management akin to that of Northern Rock in 2007, rather than the poor asset quality alleged in existing literature. It furthermore argues that the Bank of England’s prompt efforts to contain the crisis are evidence of a Lender of Last Resort in action, some thirty years before the classical formulation of the concept by Henry Thornton. ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Paul Kosmetatos.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1. ‘A Year of Confusion, Dismay, and Distress’: The 1772–73 Financial Crisis and Its Potential Significance -- 2. A Minsky Bubble? Economic Growth and the Financial Sector in 1763–72 -- 3. ‘Roguery’, ‘Stupidity’, and Permissive Regulation: Asset Speculation and Speculative Projects in 1763–72 -- 4. Propagation and Containment: Financial Contagion and the Lender of Last Resort in 1772–73 -- 5. Impact and Resolution -- 6. Conclusion. . ;en_US
dc.format.extentXXIV, 334 p. 45 illus., 9 illus. in color. ; online resource. ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishing :en_US
dc.publisherImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance ;en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance ;en_US
dc.relation.haspart9783319709086.pdfen_US
dc.subjectFinance. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinance--History. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinance. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinancial History. ;en_US
dc.titleThe 1772–73 British Credit Crisisen_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeCham :en_US
dc.classification.lcHG171 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc332.09 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:مدیریت مالی گرایش بانکداری

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9783319709086.pdf5.29 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKosmetatos, Paul. ; author. ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-28T08:41:29Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-28T08:41:29Z-
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/92-
dc.descriptionSpringerLink (Online service) ;en_US
dc.descriptionPrinted edition: ; 9783319709079 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.description.abstractNowadays remembered mostly through Adam Smith’s references to the short-lived Ayr Bank in the Wealth of Nations, the 1772-3 financial crisis was an important historical episode in its own right, taking place during a pivotal period in the development of financial capitalism and coinciding with the start of the traditional industrialisation narrative. It was also one of the earliest purely financial crises occurring in peacetime, and its progress showed an impressive geographical reach, involving England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the North American colonies. This book uses a variety of previously unpublished archival sources to question the bubble narrative usually associated with this crisis, and to identify the mechanisms of financial contagion that allowed the failure of a small private bank in London to cause rapid and severe distress throughout the 18th century financial system. It re-examines the short and turbulent career of the Ayr Bank, and concludes that its failure was the result of cavalier liability management akin to that of Northern Rock in 2007, rather than the poor asset quality alleged in existing literature. It furthermore argues that the Bank of England’s prompt efforts to contain the crisis are evidence of a Lender of Last Resort in action, some thirty years before the classical formulation of the concept by Henry Thornton. ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Paul Kosmetatos.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1. ‘A Year of Confusion, Dismay, and Distress’: The 1772–73 Financial Crisis and Its Potential Significance -- 2. A Minsky Bubble? Economic Growth and the Financial Sector in 1763–72 -- 3. ‘Roguery’, ‘Stupidity’, and Permissive Regulation: Asset Speculation and Speculative Projects in 1763–72 -- 4. Propagation and Containment: Financial Contagion and the Lender of Last Resort in 1772–73 -- 5. Impact and Resolution -- 6. Conclusion. . ;en_US
dc.format.extentXXIV, 334 p. 45 illus., 9 illus. in color. ; online resource. ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishing :en_US
dc.publisherImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance ;en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPalgrave Studies in the History of Finance ;en_US
dc.relation.haspart9783319709086.pdfen_US
dc.subjectFinance. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinance--History. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinance. ;en_US
dc.subjectFinancial History. ;en_US
dc.titleThe 1772–73 British Credit Crisisen_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeCham :en_US
dc.classification.lcHG171 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc332.09 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:مدیریت مالی گرایش بانکداری

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9783319709086.pdf5.29 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File