Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://localhost/handle/Hannan/43
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSciso, Elena, ; editor ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-28T08:41:07Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-28T08:41:07Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9783319578552 ;en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3319578553 ;en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/43-
dc.descriptionAvailable to OhioLINK libraries ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOhio Library and Information Network ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOriginal ; 9783319578545 ; 3319578545 ; (OCoLC)981117354 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.description.abstractThis book investigates the strengths and weaknesses - in terms of transparency and compliance with the democratic principle - of Bretton Woods Institutions, considering the most important innovations from the original framework achieved through the introduction of independent accountability and complaint mechanisms (the Inspection Panel and Independent Evaluation Office), but also due to relevant reforms in the internal governance of the International Monetary Fund and the new financial assistance tools. One of its main focuses is on evaluating the socio-economic impact of conditionality in the countries requiring financial assistance, acknowledging the need to strengthen social protection policies in the adjustment programs. In addition, emphasis is given to the effects of the "constitutionalization" of the Washington Consensus in the European Union, with the establishment of the so-called "Berlin-Brussels-Frankfurt Consensus.".-- ; Provided by publisher ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityElena Sciso, editoren_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsPreface; Contents; Contributors; Part I: The Governance and the Reforms in Progress; Transparency and Democracy in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund and Reforms in Progress: A Voting Power Analys...; 1 The Reforms; 2 Real and Apparent Voting Power; 3 Weighted Voting and Voting Power Analysis; 4 Weighted Voting in the IMF Governors; 5 Impact of the Reforms on Voting Power Distribution; 6 Gainers and Losers of Voting Power; 7 Conclusions; Appendix; References; The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund in Response to the Global Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents2 The Adequacy of Fund?? Resources and the Role of Quotas3 The Legitimacy Problem of the Fund and the Quota Shares; 4 The Review of the Lending Instruments of the Fund; 5 Conclusions; References; China and The IMF: A Troubled Relationship; 1 Introduction; 2 The Beijing Consensus: A Successful Model?; 3 The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: The Seed of an Emerging Asian Monetary Fund; 4 The Inclusion of Renminbi in the Basket of IMF Special Drawing Rights; 5 The Representation of China Inside the Fund: Concluding Remarks; References ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsThe New Development Bank: Another BRICS in the Wall?1 Introduction: The Missed Reform of International Monetary Fund as a Driving Force for BRICS Countries; 2 The New Development Bank; 3 The NDB?? Governance and the Impact on Membership; 4 Outlook and Final Remarks; References; Part II: The Constitutionalization of the ?????ashington Consensus ???n the European Union; From Washington Consensus to Brussels Consensus; 1 Introduction; 2 The New Classicism; 3 The Maastricht Treaty: The Consensus in the Constitution; 4 Global Death and European Resurgence of the Washington Consensus ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents5 The IMF Mea Culpa6 Conclusion; References; The Constitutionalization of the Washington Consensus in the European Union: Giving up the Social Market Economy; 1 The Washington Consensus and Its Influence on Bretton Woods Institutions; 2 The Treaty of Maastricht and Its Limits; 3 The Washington Consensus and Its Influence on the Maastricht Treaty; 4 No Changes in the European Approach to Monetary and Economic Policy Despite the Crisis; 5 Concluding Remarks; References; Participatory Democracy Within the Revision of the European Economic Governance Due to the Euro-Zone Crisis ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1 Introductory Remarks2 The Debate on the Weak Democratic Legitimacy of the Revised Governance; 3 Democracy Under the Treaty on the European Union as Revised by the Lisbon Treaty; 4 Participatory Democracy Within the European Union and Within Named International Economic Organizations; 5 Conclusion; References; Brexit. Europe Betrayed?; 1 The Island and Brussels; 2 Creative Austerity; 3 Speculation: From Exchange Rates to Sovereign Debt; 4 Brexit and the P Factor; References; Part III: Accountability and Independent Complaint Mechanisms; Independent Accountability Mechanisms ;en_US
dc.format.extent1 online resource ;en_US
dc.format.extentIncludes bibliographical references ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer ;en_US
dc.publisherG. Giappichelli Editore,en_US
dc.relation.haspart9783319578552.pdfen_US
dc.subjectInternational Monetary Fund ;en_US
dc.subjectWorld Bank ;en_US
dc.subjectUnited Nations Monetary and Financial Conference ; (1944 : ; Bretton Woods, N.H.) ;en_US
dc.subjectInternational finance ;en_US
dc.subjectDemocracy ;en_US
dc.titleAccountability, transparency and democracy in the functioning of Bretton Woods institutions /en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeCham, Switzerland :en_US
dc.publisher.place[Torino] :en_US
dc.classification.lcHG3881.5.I58 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc332.152 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:مدیریت مالی گرایش بانکداری

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9783319578552.pdf3.36 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSciso, Elena, ; editor ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-28T08:41:07Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-28T08:41:07Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9783319578552 ;en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3319578553 ;en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/43-
dc.descriptionAvailable to OhioLINK libraries ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOhio Library and Information Network ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOriginal ; 9783319578545 ; 3319578545 ; (OCoLC)981117354 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.description.abstractThis book investigates the strengths and weaknesses - in terms of transparency and compliance with the democratic principle - of Bretton Woods Institutions, considering the most important innovations from the original framework achieved through the introduction of independent accountability and complaint mechanisms (the Inspection Panel and Independent Evaluation Office), but also due to relevant reforms in the internal governance of the International Monetary Fund and the new financial assistance tools. One of its main focuses is on evaluating the socio-economic impact of conditionality in the countries requiring financial assistance, acknowledging the need to strengthen social protection policies in the adjustment programs. In addition, emphasis is given to the effects of the "constitutionalization" of the Washington Consensus in the European Union, with the establishment of the so-called "Berlin-Brussels-Frankfurt Consensus.".-- ; Provided by publisher ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityElena Sciso, editoren_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsPreface; Contents; Contributors; Part I: The Governance and the Reforms in Progress; Transparency and Democracy in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund and Reforms in Progress: A Voting Power Analys...; 1 The Reforms; 2 Real and Apparent Voting Power; 3 Weighted Voting and Voting Power Analysis; 4 Weighted Voting in the IMF Governors; 5 Impact of the Reforms on Voting Power Distribution; 6 Gainers and Losers of Voting Power; 7 Conclusions; Appendix; References; The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund in Response to the Global Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents2 The Adequacy of Fund?? Resources and the Role of Quotas3 The Legitimacy Problem of the Fund and the Quota Shares; 4 The Review of the Lending Instruments of the Fund; 5 Conclusions; References; China and The IMF: A Troubled Relationship; 1 Introduction; 2 The Beijing Consensus: A Successful Model?; 3 The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: The Seed of an Emerging Asian Monetary Fund; 4 The Inclusion of Renminbi in the Basket of IMF Special Drawing Rights; 5 The Representation of China Inside the Fund: Concluding Remarks; References ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsThe New Development Bank: Another BRICS in the Wall?1 Introduction: The Missed Reform of International Monetary Fund as a Driving Force for BRICS Countries; 2 The New Development Bank; 3 The NDB?? Governance and the Impact on Membership; 4 Outlook and Final Remarks; References; Part II: The Constitutionalization of the ?????ashington Consensus ???n the European Union; From Washington Consensus to Brussels Consensus; 1 Introduction; 2 The New Classicism; 3 The Maastricht Treaty: The Consensus in the Constitution; 4 Global Death and European Resurgence of the Washington Consensus ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents5 The IMF Mea Culpa6 Conclusion; References; The Constitutionalization of the Washington Consensus in the European Union: Giving up the Social Market Economy; 1 The Washington Consensus and Its Influence on Bretton Woods Institutions; 2 The Treaty of Maastricht and Its Limits; 3 The Washington Consensus and Its Influence on the Maastricht Treaty; 4 No Changes in the European Approach to Monetary and Economic Policy Despite the Crisis; 5 Concluding Remarks; References; Participatory Democracy Within the Revision of the European Economic Governance Due to the Euro-Zone Crisis ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1 Introductory Remarks2 The Debate on the Weak Democratic Legitimacy of the Revised Governance; 3 Democracy Under the Treaty on the European Union as Revised by the Lisbon Treaty; 4 Participatory Democracy Within the European Union and Within Named International Economic Organizations; 5 Conclusion; References; Brexit. Europe Betrayed?; 1 The Island and Brussels; 2 Creative Austerity; 3 Speculation: From Exchange Rates to Sovereign Debt; 4 Brexit and the P Factor; References; Part III: Accountability and Independent Complaint Mechanisms; Independent Accountability Mechanisms ;en_US
dc.format.extent1 online resource ;en_US
dc.format.extentIncludes bibliographical references ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer ;en_US
dc.publisherG. Giappichelli Editore,en_US
dc.relation.haspart9783319578552.pdfen_US
dc.subjectInternational Monetary Fund ;en_US
dc.subjectWorld Bank ;en_US
dc.subjectUnited Nations Monetary and Financial Conference ; (1944 : ; Bretton Woods, N.H.) ;en_US
dc.subjectInternational finance ;en_US
dc.subjectDemocracy ;en_US
dc.titleAccountability, transparency and democracy in the functioning of Bretton Woods institutions /en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeCham, Switzerland :en_US
dc.publisher.place[Torino] :en_US
dc.classification.lcHG3881.5.I58 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc332.152 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:مدیریت مالی گرایش بانکداری

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9783319578552.pdf3.36 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSciso, Elena, ; editor ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-28T08:41:07Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-28T08:41:07Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9783319578552 ;en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3319578553 ;en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/43-
dc.descriptionAvailable to OhioLINK libraries ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOhio Library and Information Network ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOriginal ; 9783319578545 ; 3319578545 ; (OCoLC)981117354 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.description.abstractThis book investigates the strengths and weaknesses - in terms of transparency and compliance with the democratic principle - of Bretton Woods Institutions, considering the most important innovations from the original framework achieved through the introduction of independent accountability and complaint mechanisms (the Inspection Panel and Independent Evaluation Office), but also due to relevant reforms in the internal governance of the International Monetary Fund and the new financial assistance tools. One of its main focuses is on evaluating the socio-economic impact of conditionality in the countries requiring financial assistance, acknowledging the need to strengthen social protection policies in the adjustment programs. In addition, emphasis is given to the effects of the "constitutionalization" of the Washington Consensus in the European Union, with the establishment of the so-called "Berlin-Brussels-Frankfurt Consensus.".-- ; Provided by publisher ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityElena Sciso, editoren_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsPreface; Contents; Contributors; Part I: The Governance and the Reforms in Progress; Transparency and Democracy in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund and Reforms in Progress: A Voting Power Analys...; 1 The Reforms; 2 Real and Apparent Voting Power; 3 Weighted Voting and Voting Power Analysis; 4 Weighted Voting in the IMF Governors; 5 Impact of the Reforms on Voting Power Distribution; 6 Gainers and Losers of Voting Power; 7 Conclusions; Appendix; References; The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund in Response to the Global Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents2 The Adequacy of Fund?? Resources and the Role of Quotas3 The Legitimacy Problem of the Fund and the Quota Shares; 4 The Review of the Lending Instruments of the Fund; 5 Conclusions; References; China and The IMF: A Troubled Relationship; 1 Introduction; 2 The Beijing Consensus: A Successful Model?; 3 The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: The Seed of an Emerging Asian Monetary Fund; 4 The Inclusion of Renminbi in the Basket of IMF Special Drawing Rights; 5 The Representation of China Inside the Fund: Concluding Remarks; References ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsThe New Development Bank: Another BRICS in the Wall?1 Introduction: The Missed Reform of International Monetary Fund as a Driving Force for BRICS Countries; 2 The New Development Bank; 3 The NDB?? Governance and the Impact on Membership; 4 Outlook and Final Remarks; References; Part II: The Constitutionalization of the ?????ashington Consensus ???n the European Union; From Washington Consensus to Brussels Consensus; 1 Introduction; 2 The New Classicism; 3 The Maastricht Treaty: The Consensus in the Constitution; 4 Global Death and European Resurgence of the Washington Consensus ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents5 The IMF Mea Culpa6 Conclusion; References; The Constitutionalization of the Washington Consensus in the European Union: Giving up the Social Market Economy; 1 The Washington Consensus and Its Influence on Bretton Woods Institutions; 2 The Treaty of Maastricht and Its Limits; 3 The Washington Consensus and Its Influence on the Maastricht Treaty; 4 No Changes in the European Approach to Monetary and Economic Policy Despite the Crisis; 5 Concluding Remarks; References; Participatory Democracy Within the Revision of the European Economic Governance Due to the Euro-Zone Crisis ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1 Introductory Remarks2 The Debate on the Weak Democratic Legitimacy of the Revised Governance; 3 Democracy Under the Treaty on the European Union as Revised by the Lisbon Treaty; 4 Participatory Democracy Within the European Union and Within Named International Economic Organizations; 5 Conclusion; References; Brexit. Europe Betrayed?; 1 The Island and Brussels; 2 Creative Austerity; 3 Speculation: From Exchange Rates to Sovereign Debt; 4 Brexit and the P Factor; References; Part III: Accountability and Independent Complaint Mechanisms; Independent Accountability Mechanisms ;en_US
dc.format.extent1 online resource ;en_US
dc.format.extentIncludes bibliographical references ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer ;en_US
dc.publisherG. Giappichelli Editore,en_US
dc.relation.haspart9783319578552.pdfen_US
dc.subjectInternational Monetary Fund ;en_US
dc.subjectWorld Bank ;en_US
dc.subjectUnited Nations Monetary and Financial Conference ; (1944 : ; Bretton Woods, N.H.) ;en_US
dc.subjectInternational finance ;en_US
dc.subjectDemocracy ;en_US
dc.titleAccountability, transparency and democracy in the functioning of Bretton Woods institutions /en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeCham, Switzerland :en_US
dc.publisher.place[Torino] :en_US
dc.classification.lcHG3881.5.I58 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc332.152 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:مدیریت مالی گرایش بانکداری

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9783319578552.pdf3.36 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File