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dc.contributor.authorDastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, ; author ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-17T08:42:20Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-17T08:42:20Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9784431553960 ;en_US
dc.identifier.isbn4431553967 ;en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/2978-
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionAvailable to OhioLINK libraries ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOhio Library and Information Network ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionPrint version: ; 4431553959 ; 9784431553953 ; (OCoLC)898418681 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionPrint version: ; 4431553959 ; 9784431553953 ; (OCoLC)898418681 ;en_US
dc.description.abstractThis book provides an economic analysis of various aspects of 'market quality', a new concept which emerged in the 21st century, using the tools of 'oligopoly theory' and 'auction theory' that evolved over the 19th and 20th centuries. In the economics literature the link between the theories of oligopoly and auctions with market quality remains largely unexplored. This book attempts to forge such a link as it brings together relevant theoretical results in the literature on these topics under a unified framework. While the book is mainly theoretical in nature, it also discusses some specific issues related to the problems of market quality in emerging economies like India. Illustrated by carefully chosen examples, this book is highly recommended to readers who seek an in-depth and up-to-date integrated overview of the new field of market quality economics and are interested in some open research problems in this area.How should auctions and other allocation mechanisms be designed for oligopolistic industries to achieve such goals as efficiency, high-quality output and fast productione Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar's book offers novel analysis of this question and also some interesting answers. Highly recommended. Eric S. Maskin, Nobel laureate in Economics ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityKrishnendu Ghosh Dastidaren_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsPreface; Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Author; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Oligopoly Theory; 1.1.1 The Classical Literature; 1.1.2 Modern Times: Game Theory and Oligopoly; 1.1.3 Mechanism Design and Regulation; 1.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Oligopoly Theory; 1.2 Auction Theory; 1.2.1 Why Study Auctione; 1.2.2 Basics of Auction Theory; 1.2.3 Basic Results of the Canonical Model; 1.2.4 Interdependent Values; 1.2.5 Some Other Extensions; 1.2.6 Recent Work and Practical Auction Design; 1.2.7 Concluding Remarks on Auction Theory; 1.3 Market Quality; 1.3.1 Basic Concepts ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1.3.2 Definition and Measures of Market Quality1.3.3 A Historical Background; 1.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Market Quality; 1.4 Summary of the Book; 2 Allocation of Scarce Resources; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 The 2G Spectrum Scam in India; 2.1.2 The Coal-Block Scam; 2.1.3 Appropriate Policy for Allocating Scarce Resource; 2.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Equilibrium Outcome When Costs Are Not Interrelated; 2.3.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.4 Equilibrium Outcome with Interrelated Costs; 2.4.1 Third Stage Equilibrium ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents2.4.2 Second Stage Equilibrium2.4.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.5 Strict Capacity Constraints; 2.5.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Market Quality: Quality of Information and Products; 3.1.2 Poor Product Quality: Some Examples; 3.1.3 Incompetent and Fraudulent Inspection; 3.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 3.1.5 Related Literature; 3.2 The Basic Model; 3.3 Model 1: Corruption in Quality Monitoring ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents3.3.1 Model 1-Third-Stage Equilibrium3.3.2 Model 1- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Model 1- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Example; 3.3.5 Model 1: Discussion of the Results; 3.3.6 Concluding remarks on Model 1; 3.4 Model 2: Incompetence in Quality Monitoring; 3.4.1 Model 2 -- Third-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.2 Model 2 -- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.3 Model 2 -- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.4 Concluding Remarks on Model 2; 4 On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions; 4.1 Introduction; 4.1.1 Scoring Auction: The Baseline Model; 4.1.2 Examples of Scoring Auctions; 4.1.3 Relevant Literature ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents4.1.4 Summary of Our Findings4.2 The Model; 4.3 Equilibrium in First-Score and Second-Score Auctions; 4.3.1 Order Statistics: Some Notations and Preliminaries; 4.4 Equilibrium Characterization; 4.4.1 Equilibrium Score, Quality and Price; 4.4.2 Impact of an Increase in n (The Number of Bidders); 4.5 Expected Scores; 4.5.1 Some Preliminary Results; 4.5.2 Expected Scores: Second-Score Versus First-Score; 4.6 Extension: Total Welfare with eeQuality over Price' Scoring Rule; 4.6.1 Total Expected Welfare; 4.7 Conclusion; 5 Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies; 5.1 Introduction ;en_US
dc.format.extent1 online resource ;en_US
dc.format.extentIncludes bibliographical references and index ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Japan KK,en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics, law, and institutions in Asia Pacific ;en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics, law, and institutions in Asia Pacific ;en_US
dc.relation.haspart9784431553960.pdfen_US
dc.subjectGlobalization ; Economic aspects ;en_US
dc.subjectInternational economic relations ;en_US
dc.subjectOligopolies ;en_US
dc.subjectMarkets ;en_US
dc.subjectIndustrial organization ;en_US
dc.subjectDevelopment economics ;en_US
dc.subjectEconomics ;en_US
dc.subjectEconomics ;en_US
dc.subjectIndustrial Organization ;en_US
dc.subjectDevelopment Economics ;en_US
dc.subjectEmerging Markets/Globalizaten_US
dc.titleOligopoly, auctions and market quality /en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeTokyo, Japan :en_US
dc.classification.lcHF1365 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc337 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:تمامی گرایش های مدیریت شامل مدیریت بازرگانی و صنعتی

Files in This Item:
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9784431553960.pdf2.96 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Full metadata record
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dc.contributor.authorDastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, ; author ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-17T08:42:20Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-17T08:42:20Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9784431553960 ;en_US
dc.identifier.isbn4431553967 ;en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/2978-
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionAvailable to OhioLINK libraries ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOhio Library and Information Network ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionPrint version: ; 4431553959 ; 9784431553953 ; (OCoLC)898418681 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionPrint version: ; 4431553959 ; 9784431553953 ; (OCoLC)898418681 ;en_US
dc.description.abstractThis book provides an economic analysis of various aspects of 'market quality', a new concept which emerged in the 21st century, using the tools of 'oligopoly theory' and 'auction theory' that evolved over the 19th and 20th centuries. In the economics literature the link between the theories of oligopoly and auctions with market quality remains largely unexplored. This book attempts to forge such a link as it brings together relevant theoretical results in the literature on these topics under a unified framework. While the book is mainly theoretical in nature, it also discusses some specific issues related to the problems of market quality in emerging economies like India. Illustrated by carefully chosen examples, this book is highly recommended to readers who seek an in-depth and up-to-date integrated overview of the new field of market quality economics and are interested in some open research problems in this area.How should auctions and other allocation mechanisms be designed for oligopolistic industries to achieve such goals as efficiency, high-quality output and fast productione Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar's book offers novel analysis of this question and also some interesting answers. Highly recommended. Eric S. Maskin, Nobel laureate in Economics ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityKrishnendu Ghosh Dastidaren_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsPreface; Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Author; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Oligopoly Theory; 1.1.1 The Classical Literature; 1.1.2 Modern Times: Game Theory and Oligopoly; 1.1.3 Mechanism Design and Regulation; 1.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Oligopoly Theory; 1.2 Auction Theory; 1.2.1 Why Study Auctione; 1.2.2 Basics of Auction Theory; 1.2.3 Basic Results of the Canonical Model; 1.2.4 Interdependent Values; 1.2.5 Some Other Extensions; 1.2.6 Recent Work and Practical Auction Design; 1.2.7 Concluding Remarks on Auction Theory; 1.3 Market Quality; 1.3.1 Basic Concepts ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1.3.2 Definition and Measures of Market Quality1.3.3 A Historical Background; 1.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Market Quality; 1.4 Summary of the Book; 2 Allocation of Scarce Resources; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 The 2G Spectrum Scam in India; 2.1.2 The Coal-Block Scam; 2.1.3 Appropriate Policy for Allocating Scarce Resource; 2.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Equilibrium Outcome When Costs Are Not Interrelated; 2.3.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.4 Equilibrium Outcome with Interrelated Costs; 2.4.1 Third Stage Equilibrium ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents2.4.2 Second Stage Equilibrium2.4.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.5 Strict Capacity Constraints; 2.5.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Market Quality: Quality of Information and Products; 3.1.2 Poor Product Quality: Some Examples; 3.1.3 Incompetent and Fraudulent Inspection; 3.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 3.1.5 Related Literature; 3.2 The Basic Model; 3.3 Model 1: Corruption in Quality Monitoring ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents3.3.1 Model 1-Third-Stage Equilibrium3.3.2 Model 1- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Model 1- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Example; 3.3.5 Model 1: Discussion of the Results; 3.3.6 Concluding remarks on Model 1; 3.4 Model 2: Incompetence in Quality Monitoring; 3.4.1 Model 2 -- Third-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.2 Model 2 -- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.3 Model 2 -- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.4 Concluding Remarks on Model 2; 4 On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions; 4.1 Introduction; 4.1.1 Scoring Auction: The Baseline Model; 4.1.2 Examples of Scoring Auctions; 4.1.3 Relevant Literature ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents4.1.4 Summary of Our Findings4.2 The Model; 4.3 Equilibrium in First-Score and Second-Score Auctions; 4.3.1 Order Statistics: Some Notations and Preliminaries; 4.4 Equilibrium Characterization; 4.4.1 Equilibrium Score, Quality and Price; 4.4.2 Impact of an Increase in n (The Number of Bidders); 4.5 Expected Scores; 4.5.1 Some Preliminary Results; 4.5.2 Expected Scores: Second-Score Versus First-Score; 4.6 Extension: Total Welfare with eeQuality over Price' Scoring Rule; 4.6.1 Total Expected Welfare; 4.7 Conclusion; 5 Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies; 5.1 Introduction ;en_US
dc.format.extent1 online resource ;en_US
dc.format.extentIncludes bibliographical references and index ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Japan KK,en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics, law, and institutions in Asia Pacific ;en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics, law, and institutions in Asia Pacific ;en_US
dc.relation.haspart9784431553960.pdfen_US
dc.subjectGlobalization ; Economic aspects ;en_US
dc.subjectInternational economic relations ;en_US
dc.subjectOligopolies ;en_US
dc.subjectMarkets ;en_US
dc.subjectIndustrial organization ;en_US
dc.subjectDevelopment economics ;en_US
dc.subjectEconomics ;en_US
dc.subjectEconomics ;en_US
dc.subjectIndustrial Organization ;en_US
dc.subjectDevelopment Economics ;en_US
dc.subjectEmerging Markets/Globalizaten_US
dc.titleOligopoly, auctions and market quality /en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeTokyo, Japan :en_US
dc.classification.lcHF1365 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc337 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:تمامی گرایش های مدیریت شامل مدیریت بازرگانی و صنعتی

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9784431553960.pdf2.96 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, ; author ;en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-17T08:42:20Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-17T08:42:20Z-
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9784431553960 ;en_US
dc.identifier.isbn4431553967 ;en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://localhost/handle/Hannan/2978-
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionAvailable to OhioLINK libraries ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionOhio Library and Information Network ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionPrint version: ; 4431553959 ; 9784431553953 ; (OCoLC)898418681 ;en_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionen_US
dc.descriptionPrint version: ; 4431553959 ; 9784431553953 ; (OCoLC)898418681 ;en_US
dc.description.abstractThis book provides an economic analysis of various aspects of 'market quality', a new concept which emerged in the 21st century, using the tools of 'oligopoly theory' and 'auction theory' that evolved over the 19th and 20th centuries. In the economics literature the link between the theories of oligopoly and auctions with market quality remains largely unexplored. This book attempts to forge such a link as it brings together relevant theoretical results in the literature on these topics under a unified framework. While the book is mainly theoretical in nature, it also discusses some specific issues related to the problems of market quality in emerging economies like India. Illustrated by carefully chosen examples, this book is highly recommended to readers who seek an in-depth and up-to-date integrated overview of the new field of market quality economics and are interested in some open research problems in this area.How should auctions and other allocation mechanisms be designed for oligopolistic industries to achieve such goals as efficiency, high-quality output and fast productione Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar's book offers novel analysis of this question and also some interesting answers. Highly recommended. Eric S. Maskin, Nobel laureate in Economics ;en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityKrishnendu Ghosh Dastidaren_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsPreface; Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Author; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Oligopoly Theory; 1.1.1 The Classical Literature; 1.1.2 Modern Times: Game Theory and Oligopoly; 1.1.3 Mechanism Design and Regulation; 1.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Oligopoly Theory; 1.2 Auction Theory; 1.2.1 Why Study Auctione; 1.2.2 Basics of Auction Theory; 1.2.3 Basic Results of the Canonical Model; 1.2.4 Interdependent Values; 1.2.5 Some Other Extensions; 1.2.6 Recent Work and Practical Auction Design; 1.2.7 Concluding Remarks on Auction Theory; 1.3 Market Quality; 1.3.1 Basic Concepts ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents1.3.2 Definition and Measures of Market Quality1.3.3 A Historical Background; 1.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Market Quality; 1.4 Summary of the Book; 2 Allocation of Scarce Resources; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 The 2G Spectrum Scam in India; 2.1.2 The Coal-Block Scam; 2.1.3 Appropriate Policy for Allocating Scarce Resource; 2.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Equilibrium Outcome When Costs Are Not Interrelated; 2.3.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.4 Equilibrium Outcome with Interrelated Costs; 2.4.1 Third Stage Equilibrium ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents2.4.2 Second Stage Equilibrium2.4.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.5 Strict Capacity Constraints; 2.5.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Market Quality: Quality of Information and Products; 3.1.2 Poor Product Quality: Some Examples; 3.1.3 Incompetent and Fraudulent Inspection; 3.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 3.1.5 Related Literature; 3.2 The Basic Model; 3.3 Model 1: Corruption in Quality Monitoring ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents3.3.1 Model 1-Third-Stage Equilibrium3.3.2 Model 1- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Model 1- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Example; 3.3.5 Model 1: Discussion of the Results; 3.3.6 Concluding remarks on Model 1; 3.4 Model 2: Incompetence in Quality Monitoring; 3.4.1 Model 2 -- Third-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.2 Model 2 -- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.3 Model 2 -- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.4 Concluding Remarks on Model 2; 4 On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions; 4.1 Introduction; 4.1.1 Scoring Auction: The Baseline Model; 4.1.2 Examples of Scoring Auctions; 4.1.3 Relevant Literature ;en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents4.1.4 Summary of Our Findings4.2 The Model; 4.3 Equilibrium in First-Score and Second-Score Auctions; 4.3.1 Order Statistics: Some Notations and Preliminaries; 4.4 Equilibrium Characterization; 4.4.1 Equilibrium Score, Quality and Price; 4.4.2 Impact of an Increase in n (The Number of Bidders); 4.5 Expected Scores; 4.5.1 Some Preliminary Results; 4.5.2 Expected Scores: Second-Score Versus First-Score; 4.6 Extension: Total Welfare with eeQuality over Price' Scoring Rule; 4.6.1 Total Expected Welfare; 4.7 Conclusion; 5 Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies; 5.1 Introduction ;en_US
dc.format.extent1 online resource ;en_US
dc.format.extentIncludes bibliographical references and index ;en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Japan KK,en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics, law, and institutions in Asia Pacific ;en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics, law, and institutions in Asia Pacific ;en_US
dc.relation.haspart9784431553960.pdfen_US
dc.subjectGlobalization ; Economic aspects ;en_US
dc.subjectInternational economic relations ;en_US
dc.subjectOligopolies ;en_US
dc.subjectMarkets ;en_US
dc.subjectIndustrial organization ;en_US
dc.subjectDevelopment economics ;en_US
dc.subjectEconomics ;en_US
dc.subjectEconomics ;en_US
dc.subjectIndustrial Organization ;en_US
dc.subjectDevelopment Economics ;en_US
dc.subjectEmerging Markets/Globalizaten_US
dc.titleOligopoly, auctions and market quality /en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
dc.publisher.placeTokyo, Japan :en_US
dc.classification.lcHF1365 ;en_US
dc.classification.dc337 ; 23 ;en_US
Appears in Collections:تمامی گرایش های مدیریت شامل مدیریت بازرگانی و صنعتی

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
9784431553960.pdf2.96 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Preview File